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As with any situation that involves economical risk refineries may share their risk with insurers. The decision process generally
includes modelling to determine to which extent the process area can be damaged. On the extreme end of modelling the so-called
Estimated Maximum Loss (EML) scenarios are found. These scenarios predict the maximum loss a particular installation can
sustain. Unfortunately no standard model for this exists. Thus the insurers reach diﬀerent results due to applying diﬀerent models
and diﬀerent assumptions. Therefore, a study has been conducted on a case in a Swedish refinery where several scenarios previously
had been modelled by two diﬀerent insurance brokers using two diﬀerent softwares, ExTool and SLAM. This study reviews the
concept of EML and analyses the used models to see which parameters are most uncertain. Also a third model, EFFECTS, was
employed in an attempt to reach a conclusion with higher reliability.
1. Introduction
The petroleum refineries share their inherent safety problems
with many other chemical processing industries. The raw
material as well as almost all of the products are highly
flammable, can give rise to vapour cloud explosions (VCEs),
and are toxic above a certain thresholdvalue. Much of
the processing, as well as storage, is done under higher
than ambient pressure, not uncommonly above 10 bars. This
ensures that loss of confinement will lead to rapid discharge
rates.
In addition to the threat to the workforce an economi-
cal risk is associated with processing flammable compounds.
not only due to the direct impact of a fire or explosion
but also the cost of business interruption (BI) in case of a
shutdown. In many cases the BI after an accident is much
more expensive than the actual repair costs due to a fire or
explosion.
Today the highest reported property damage (PD) is
from a VCE that occurred in Pasadena Texas 1989. It is
estimated that the costs to rebuild the plant were around 869
million USD (based on a 2002 USD) [1]. The BI cost in this
case was a mere 700 million USD. Notice here that the BI and
PD costs are roughly the same whereas the average, calculated
from 119 accidents, is that BI exceeds PD with a factor 2.7 [2].
A decision has to be made by the operator. How much
of my financial risk do I want an outside party to carry,
and how much money do I consider is a fair price for that
service? The decision process generally includes modelling of
various scenarios to determine to which extent the process
area can be damaged. On the extreme end of modelling
the so-called Estimated Maximum Loss (EML) scenarios are
found. These models try to predict the maximum loss a
particular installation can sustain due to an accident. Within
the refinery industry these scenarios usually consist of a
number of diﬀerent vapour cloud explosions. For obvious
reasons such scenarios are riddled with uncertainties. Some
scenarios are frowned upon by some and deemed plausible
by others.
Unfortunately the gas explosion models available today
are by no means perfect. The models are occasionally oﬀ
with a factor two, regardless of its being empirical models or
computational fluid dynamics [3]. Recently even more doubt
has been cast on the models that are of use today since none
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of them are able to predict the damage seen at the Buncefield
oil depot [4].
Two diﬀerent EML studies have been carried out at
the refinery in Lysekil, Sweden by two diﬀerent brokers,
for confidentiality reasons henceforth referred to as “Broker
A” and “Broker B”. Apart from the diﬀerences from using
diﬀerent modelling tools, there is also no set standard for
which assumptions to base an EML study upon. Thus the
previous two studies have generated very varied conclusions.
The maximum property damages estimated by Broker A
and Broker B are 2 390 000 000 SEK, and 6 430 000 000 SEK,
respectively. Broker B has identified five diﬀerent scenarios
that are more expensive on a property damage base than
the highest one for Broker A. Even when the scenarios are
based on the same process equipment failure the numbers
diﬀer. For instance a major breach on V2505, which is an
intermediate storage tank for a mixture mainly consisting of
butane would lead to a PD of either 1 470 000 000 SEK or 4
100 000 000 SEK, a diﬀerence of almost 300%.
In order to make a sound business decision a remod-
elling of the proposed scenarios has been conducted. The
sources of diﬀerence between the previous models have been
determined and some recommendations and thoughts on
the concept of EML are given.
2. Aim of the Study
The main objectives of this study are as follows:
(i) to compare EML studies carried out by two diﬀerent
insurance brokers for a Swedish refinery,
(ii) to remodel and remove some of the uncertain
parameters by using a third party software,
(iii) to review the EML concept and highlight areas with
uncertainties that needs improvements in the future.
This paper is prepared on the basis of a Master of
Science thesis carried out at Chalmers University of
Technology [6].
3. Methodology
A definition of the EML concept was given by Canaway [7]
“The eﬀect of spillage of flammable substance or inventory
from the largest discrete circuit and so forth. In the EML
analysis, no prediction of the ignition source location may
be made in order to reduce the damage level.”
In this study an EML is defined as a single release of
inventory from a vessel and the resulting formation of a
drifting vapour cloud. An ignition following the formation
of the vapour cloud, generates an explosion, thus causing
property damage. In general domino eﬀects are not modelled
in EML’s and the same methodology with a single accident
has been used in this study.
The two brokers EML calculations where studied in
detail in order to identify and determine the sources of
deviations. Thereafter, using software developed by TNO,
called EFFECTS, where all physical models are described
in the yellow book [8], a remodelling of all scenarios
Thorough study of two different brokers EML
studies prepared for the refinery
Literature searching: looking for modelling of
vapour cloud explosion and EML concept
Establishing study objectives after consulting
with the safety specialists of the refinery
Visual inspection of the refinery
Identification of EML scenarios using brain
storming study
Decision about inventory released
Validation of the process data using on site
process data software program
(1) Deciding type of equipment failure
(2) Estimation of the failure frequencies
(3) Modelling of the identified scenarios applying EFFECT 
developed by TNO (Holland)
(4) Estimation of the damages
Evaluation of all three softwares with modelled scenarios as
background
Data was
prepared
from the
site
Figure 1: Methodology of the study.
investigated by both of the companies has been done.
Figure 1 summarizes the steps taken.
The two most “expensive” scenarios presented by the two
companies have also been remodelled to find out which of
the two that are to be considered as the more reliable one.
During the modelling a more thorough method has been
used than the one employed by the two companies. Since
EFFECTS allow linking of scenarios it has been possible to
start with a pipe connection failure, proceed with a spray
release, then model the dispersion of the gas cloud and
thereafter model the overpressure after ignition. As precise
input data as possible have been used, including height of
release, and normal filling degree of vessels. Where diﬀerent
types of distillation columns have been selected as points of
origin a more accurate calculation of release rates has been
used.
A less improbable version of a containment failure has
been used in all the modelling conducted. The bottom flange
on each studied vessel has been modelled as ruptured, and
the resulting jets release rate calculated. The brokers models
instead assume a sudden burst, where the whole inventory
all at once appear on the outside of the vessel. Though
the probability of catastrophic failure of a vessel and total
rupture of the piping connection modelled herein is not that
diﬀerent, 2 and 5 [cpm] (failure frequency of 10−6 per year
= cpm), respectively, [9], the rupture pipe model allows for a
more accurate modelling of the following step, dispersion of
the cloud.
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Although of interest for the operator, the concept of BI
has been neglected in this study. BI is a consequence of a
major accident and can be deducted from the damages from
that accident. Instead of guessing delivery times for diﬀerent
process equipment and time for investigation and possible
reengineering of the process, the BI concept has been left to
those that are more suited to make such estimations.
4. Modelling Vapour Cloud Explosions
Broker A is using the SLAM software, which is based on the
Congestion Assessment Method. Broker B is using the ExTool
software, which is based on the TNT equivalency method.
EFFECTS is based on the Multi-Energy Method.
A brief description of the three diﬀerent empirical
methods mentioned will be given as well as the reason for
not using CFD, the most accurate modelling technique.
TNT Equivalency Method (ExTool). The TNT equivalency
method assumes that a vapour cloud explosion is similar to
an explosion of a high charge explosive, TNT.
A pressure-distance curve yields the peak pressure, where
the distance is scaled with a TNT mass equivalent. The TNT
equivalent WTNT is obtained as the product between the
explosion yield and the mass of hydrocarbons WHC in the
vapour cloud in accordance with (1):
WTNT = 10 · η ·WHC
[
kg TNT
]
. (1)
η is the empirical yield factor, normally set between 0.03–
0.05. The factor 10 is used since most hydrocarbons have a
10 times higher heat of combustion than TNT. The quota
between the diﬀerent heat of combustion (hcfuel/hcTNT) can
be used for other fuel types. The main weaknesses of the TNT
method is that the yield factor and pressure-distance curve
are based on empirical data and not theoretically proven.
Also, since TNT is a solid state explosive the diﬀerence in
physical behaviour between TNT and gas explosions are
substantial. With this method the predicted overpressure
diﬀerence between the model and a real VCE is most
pronounced close to, and far away, from to the centre of
explosion. The method has a weak theoretical basis, but is
used because it is simple and under most circumstances gives
a reliable upper estimate [3].
Multi-Energy Concept (EFFECTS). The multi-energy con-
cept assumes that only the confined or obstructed part of a
vapour cloud give a rise in overpressure [11]. A combustion-
energy scaled distance Rce is related to the distance from the
explosion centre R0 according to:
Rce = R0
(E/P0)
1/m [m]. (2)
P0 is the atmospheric pressure and E is the total amount
of combustion energy. E is calculated as the product of
combustion energy per volume times the congested cloud
volume Vcloud. Since the total amount of combustion energy
for a stoichiometric hydrocarbon-air mixture is relatively
constant regardless of the type of hydrocarbon, it is common
to estimate the combustion energy E according to:
E ≈ 3.5Vcloud [MJ] Vcloud in
[
m3
]
. (3)
Data from explosion experiments have been fitted to the
parameter Rce and the overpressure for diﬀerent charge
strengths, dependant on, for example, strength of the
ignition source and level of congestion. The charge strength
is given a value in the range of one to ten, where ten represent
a detonation.
Setting the charge strength and the total combustion
energy is the main sources of uncertainty in the multi-energy
concept.
Congestion Assessment Method (SLAM). An assessment of
the congested region is first done in order to get a reference
pressure Pref, which is an estimation of the maximum
overpressure generated by a deflagration of a vapour cloud
of propane [12]. The reference pressure is estimated with a
decision tree that first takes confinement into account, then
congestion or obstacles in the confined area and last whether
there are strong ignition sources. There are some similarities
between the choice of charge strength in Multi-Energy
method and the choice of Pref in CAM. If the vapour cloud
does not consist of propane a fuel factor is multiplied to the
reference pressure to get a maximum source pressure.With
the maximum source pressure, the overpressure at a specific
distance can be given by fitted data. CAM uses data from
the MERGE (Modelling and Experimental Research into Gas
Explosions) project.
CFD Models (Computational Fluid Dynamics). A number of
diﬀerent CFD models are available today but one has to be
aware of their limitations since the models are by no means
perfect, even for simple geometries. MERGE was an EU-
founded project that tried to determine the accuracy of some
explosion models. A cubodial pipe array, shown in Figure 2,
was filled with gas and thereafter ignited in the centre. The
results, shown in Figure 3, depict a considerable spread even
for such a simple geometry.
If one were to use a CFD model to predict the damage
within a refinery it would not only take a large amount of
time for the actual modelling. First of all a three-dimensional
model of the refinery is needed. Further, the accuracy of the
model would be lowered by the fact that a normal desktop
computer today is unable to make the mesh fine enough. If
one was to apply a mesh to a typical refinery area the length
of each finite volume would be too large to yield an answer
that is precise enough to warrant the amount of time and
work needed for the modelling.
After an extensive study which included 27 large-scale
experiments Ledin (1997) [3] made the following conclusion
“My interpretation of the outcome of JIP-2 is that confidence
can be attached to the model predictions only if the new
geometry strongly resembles one of the two geometries in
the database. It must be emphasised that even with the use
of what appears to be in principle a more advanced model,
that is, CFD-based, outside its area of validation/calibration
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Figure 2: The cuboidal pipe array geometry used in the MERGE
experiments [5].
it may in fact give little overall reduction in uncertainties over
the use of simpler modelling approaches.”
The obstacle geometries of a standard refinery are thus
too complex to be handled by the available CFD models.
Thus to screen for EML-scenarios a simpler model type
should be used.
4.1. Property Damage Cost Estimation. Each process unit has
an estimated total cost for rebuilding and each overpressure
is associated with a specific damage percentage. Today it
is common to use specific threshold values. For example
between 150–350 mBar overpressure corresponds to 40%
damage. Thus one calculates the damage on each subprocess
area and thereafter sum up to reach the total damage cost. In
reality damage is related both to duration of the overpressure
and to the specific geometry of the structure [13]. Also
one should consider mechanical properties of the structure,
reflection, and so forth. However, calculations are usually
only considering peak overpressure and positive impulse
[14].
5. Analysis
The first section presents the costs for five scenarios modelled
by the two brokers. The second section discusses where
in the two models the sources of diﬀerence originate.
Focus will be on damage due to overpressure, overpressure
decay, releasable inventory, cloud weight, and cloud drifting.
The third section shows results from our study, using a
third software, EFFECTS. Modelling has been made on all
scenarios previously studied by the brokers. But details are
given just for two scenarios, D1538 (Drum) and T2302
(Tower), due to limited space of this paper.
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Figure 3: Comparison of experiment and simulation for MERGE
large scale experiments (×) COBRA predictions, ( ) EXSIM
predictions, (•) FLACS predictions, and (◦) REAGAS predictions.
Simulated maximum overpressure and experimental maximum
overpressure [mBar], [5].
5.1. Section One. The data used by Broker A and Broker B in
their modelling is given in Table 1.
The operating volume in the towers was estimated
according to two assumptions. The bottom level was
assumed to be 3 m high and the height of the liquid above
each tray was assumed to be 0.05 m. For Vessels and Drums
the assumption was that the liquid inventory was 50% of the
total volume of the vessel.
V stands for Vessel which in these cases are cylinders lying
down, D stands for Drums which are cylinders standing up
and T represents Tower.
Every scenario has its origin and ignition point within the
process area of the refinery. Larger vessels exist outside of the
process area, for example, within the storage area. But the
cost of damage to the process equipment widely outweighs
the cost of damage to the storage equipment.
The estimated property damage costs (million SEK) for
all scenarios are presented in Table 2.
5.2. Section Two. A number of modelling parameters could
be the reason for the diﬀerence between ExTool and SLAM.
Among them five were identified as the most critical potential
sources for the diﬀerence. These are damage threshold
values, overpressure decay, releasable inventory, cloud weight
calculations, and allowed cloud drift.
Damage Thresholds. SLAM and ExTool employ two diﬀerent
sets of threshold values to calculate the damage percentage
on process equipment. The values are shown as curves in
Figure 4 for clarity reasons but are used as threshold values
within the actual programs. For example, the whole area
aﬀected by an overpressure between 138–345 mBar (2–5 PSI)
will be 40% damaged according to ExTool.
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Table 1: Data given by the client to Broker A and Broker B to use in their modelling.
Equipment Service V [m3]
Operating
V [m3]
Material T [C] P [Bar] D [m] L [m]
N of
trays
Bottom
V [m3]
Tray V
[m3]
V2313
STRIPPER
RECEIVER
43 22 C2–C5 35 10 NA NA NA NA NA
D1538
COMPRESSOR
SUCTION
DRUM
30,2 15 C3 = 100% 15 7,7 NA NA NA NA NA
V2505
FEED SURGE
DRUM
47 24 C2–C5 35 15 NA NA NA NA NA
T2302 STRIPPER 564 83,8 C3–C10 196 10 4,87 30,3 30 55,9 27,9
T2304
STABILIZER
TOWER
119 23,9 C3 160 12 2,6 22,5 30 15,9 8
V : Maximum capacity, Operating V : Estimated Operating Volume, Material: Compound composition within equipment, T : Temperature, P: Pressure, D:
Diameter, L: Length, N of trays: Number of trays in separation columns, Bottom V : Estimated volume on bottom of towers, Tray V : Sum of Estimated volume
on each tray.
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Figure 4: Comparison of threshold values.
Since damage percentage and subsequent cost depends
on the overpressure as well as ignition point it is impossible
to say exactly how big impact the diﬀerent set of threshold
values give rise to. One thing can be said though, while
considering large explosions ExTool threshold values gives
rise to higher costs.
Overpressure Decay. Modelling of the pressure decay has
been made with the Matlab software. In both scenarios
100 kmol of gas was used. For the typical alkane propane
a yield factor of 6% has been used within the TNT model.
4% for a straight alkane raised by 2 percentage points
for confinement. For propene 9% yield factor was used.
Choosing 9% is done due to the fact that within CAM
propene has a 150% higher fuel factor when compared to
propane [12]. Thus this gives a fairer view on the actual
pressure decay within the models. Congestion is in both cases
set as typical within the CAM method.
As can be seen in Figure 5, with the selected parameter
values, the distance to a certain overpressure does not diﬀer
that much in the near field. However, in the far field the TNT
model gives lower overpressure than the CAM model.
Table 2: Summary of property damage (million SEK).
Scenario Equipment SLAM ExTool Direct ExTool Drifted
1 V2313 2260 3360 3710
2 D1538 2660 NA NA
3 T2302 NA 6430 6800
4 T2304 1915 2700 4130
5 V2505 1636 3400 4100
This implies that a scenario that uses the TNT-model
for its pressure decay would in fact give lower costs. In the
brokers reports ExTool yields higher costs than SLAM. Thus
it is probably not the use of the TNT or CAM method for
overpressure decay per se that gives rise to the diﬀerences in
costs.
Releasable Inventory. For the brokers modelling the releasa-
ble amount had been set to a standard value of 50 percent
of the vessel or drum size. For towers the bottom height of
liquid was assumed to be 3 m and the height of the liquid on
each tray was assumed to be 0.05 m.
The two brokers estimate releasable material in towers
in diﬀerent ways. Broker A allows only the part that is on
the bottom of the tower to participate in the vapour cloud
formation. According to Broker B the whole content of a
tower may participate in cloud formation.
In this study a more thorough survey was conducted on
the inventory of the equipment. These results are shown in
Section Three.
Cloud Weights. How to calculate cloud weight is not a part
of the TNT or the CAM model. But the softwares employed
for the overpressure decay calculations contain a method to
determine cloud weight. ExTool calculates the cloud weight
as two times the flash fraction [15] [F] which in turn is
calculated according to:
F ≈ (T − Tb)
cp,T
Hvap,T
. (4)
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Figure 5: Overpressure to distance curves for TNT and CAM method for propane (a) and propene (b).
The heat capacity and heat of vaporisation are chosen at
the initial temperature of the inventory. The heat capacity
and heat of vaporisation depends on the temperature, hence
ExTool overestimates the flash fraction.
SLAM calculates the cloud weight as the flash fraction
[16] and the flash fraction is calculated according to:
F = (T − Tb)
cp,Tmean
Hvap,T
. (5)
The heat of vaporisation is chosen at the boiling point
for the compound at atmospheric conditions, however the
heat capacity is chosen at the mean temperature between
boiling temperature and the initial reference temperature.
Since heat of vaporization and heat capacity both are
temperature dependent the same temperature should be
used for choosing physical parameters for (5). The quota
gives an underestimation of the flash fraction. Also using
only flash fraction to calculate cloud weight omits the
entrainment phenomenon further decreasing the total cloud
weight.
Cloud Drifting. ExTool has a clearly defined method to
calculate maximum cloud drifting. After modelling an
ignition at the point of release the cloud is allowed to travel
within the 138 mBar isobar to find the position associated
with the highest cost. Two objections to this method can be
raised. First, since there is no connection between wind speed
and dispersion, the cloud contains the same total weight no
matter how far it travels. Secondly this implies that the larger
the cloud, or the more reactive, the longer it will be allowed
to travel before ignition.
For SLAM no exact data on cloud drifting has been
found. But it seems that the centre of ignition normally
is within 75 m of the release point. However, so-called
“engineering judgement” has been used to override the initial
ignition point in one of the cases D1538. This can be done by
the user if a reasonable additional drift will induce significant
rise in cost.
It is not reasonable to think that a major part of the
diﬀerences in damage costs could be attributed to these
small diﬀerences in cloud drift allowance. ExTool scans large
part of the refinery and SLAM is overridden if the cost is
maximized outside the initial iteration zone.
5.3. Section Three. Using the software EFFECTS instead of
SLAM or ExTool eliminates two of the parameters mentioned
above, cloud drifting and cloud weight.
ExTool and SLAM use (4) and (5), respectively, to
calculate cloud weight. This crude method is surpassed
by EFFECTS use of so-called coupled models. The main
advantage of EFFECTS is the ability to model a chain
of events each with its specific method and then feeding
the result into the following model. The scenarios have
been modelled in the following fashion: TPDIS (bottom
venting)→ Spray Release→Dense Gas Dispersion→Dense
Gas Explosive Mass. This means that the results from each
submodel have been fed into the next to arrive at the point
of interest, cloud weight. ExTool use the TNT model for
its overpressure generation and decay and SLAM uses the
CAM method to determine the centre overpressure and
subsequent decay after ignition. In EFFECTS the coupling of
the models is continued by linking an explosion model based
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Table 3: The table shows four key parameters for cloud weight
modelling in EFFECTS. Hole rounding represents the edges of the
hole within TPDIS. Z0 is surface roughness, given in accordance
to Hanna [18] which gives the range 0.9–1.3 for a typical refinery.
Pasquill Stability F means extremely stable weather. Wind speed is
self-explanatory.
Parameter Value Unit
Hole Rounding 0.62 —
Z0 1 M
Pasquill Stability Class F —
Wind Speed 1.5 m/s
on the Multi-Energy concept to the dense gas explosive mass.
For more information on the three softwares see the yellow
book [8] for EFFECTS, the ExTool theory manual [15], and
the guidance document for SLAM [17].
Each scenario has its starting point in a complete rupture
of the nearest flange on the bottom pipe of the specific
process equipment.
For cloud weights calculations in EFFECTS four param-
eters are considered as key factors, due to their high impact
on the end result of the cloud weight modelling. These four
parameters are presented in Table 3.
The scenarios have been calculated for diﬀerent stability
classes and wind speeds. However Stability class F and wind
speed 1.5 [m/s] were found to be the worst circumstance
for every case. It should be noted that wind speeds below
1.5 [m/s] has not been tested since the dispersion model is
not considered valid for such low wind speeds.
The cloud weights calculated by three diﬀerent tools are
shown in Table 4. These values are aﬀected to a great extent
by the releasable inventory presented in Table 5.
Further elimination of uncertainty was made by using
process data and drawings of the process equipment to get
an enhanced certainty for the parameter releasable material.
For releasable material within towers, the amount of liquid
that can pass through one tray per second is lower than the
decay in explosive mass due to dispersion. Therefore only
the bottom content has been considered as taking part in the
release to estimate the maximum explosive mass. As shown
in Table 5 the diﬀerence between estimated amount and the
real amount is significant.
Using EFFECTS also eliminates the Cloud Drift param-
eter since it is possible to see the explosive mass at each
given time unit and thus eliminate extremely long drift if
additional time severely impacts explosive mass.
For modelling of the overpressure obstruction has been
considered as low, ignition source anticipated as high, and
parallel confinement has been deemed as existing. According
to Kinsella [19] these assumptions give blast strengths
ranging from 5–7. In accordance with the EML concept
the highest blast strength (7) in the range has been cho-
sen.
A comparison of blast prediction models for vapour
cloud explosion done in 2001 at the NRC shows how data
from diﬀerent models are fitted to the observed pressure data
from the Flixborough accident and the accident in La Mede
Table 4: Explosive mass in clouds [t] calculated by three diﬀerent
tools.
Equipment Broker A Broker B EFFECTS
V2313 4 7,7 9,1
D1538 3 NA 0,9
T2302 NA 34 28,3
T2304 7 9,5 5,2
V2505 4 9,2 9,3
Table 5: Releasable inventory [m3] used as starting points for
modelling.
Equipment Broker A Broker B Real amount
V2313 22 22 20,5
D1538 15 NA 10,65
T2302 NA 83,8 52,62
T2304 16 23,9 12,6
V2505 24 24 25,2
[20]. The close fit in this comparison for Multi-Energy, blast
strength 7, indicates that this is a valid choice.
As for the threshold value parameter there is no
consensus as to the usage of threshold values. It is also
beyond the scope of this study to further investigate such
values. However, as can be seen in Figure 6 the values used
by ExTool appear to be quite conservative. All scenarios
studied in EFFECTS have been modelled with both sets of
threshold values to show the diﬀerence between the results.
With the limited amount of data acquired it would be
presumptuous to point at either as definitively correct or
incorrect.
Scenario 1: D1538. Drum 1538 contains 100% propene and
is situated about 6 [m] above the ground. Average values for
pressure inside temperature and volume has been taken from
the process data average ranging from 2007-11-27 to 2007-
12-27. Data is thus set to P = 8.8 [bar], Tbulk = 14.0 [◦C],
Vl = 10.65 [m3]. To estimate a worst case scenario a total
rupture of a 6′′ pipe situated 6.05 [m] above ground has been
simulated by EFFECTS.
The digitized cloud shape 17 s after the release represent
maximum explosive mass is shown in Figure 7. The cloud
drifted approximately 200 [m], which is considered far but
not unreasonable. The time for the digitalization has been
taken from the graph shown in Figure 8 and the total area
of the cloud has been taken from the graph shown in
Figure 9.
The total area of the cloud is 3050 [m2] corresponding
to 900 [kg] explosive mass. The confined area was approx-
imated at an onsite inspection, between the dispersion and
explosion step, to be 965 [m2]. Figure 10 shows the diﬀerent
damage zones using the thresholds from SLAM. Figure 11
shows the damage zones using the threshold values from
ExTool.
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1.5psi = 10% damage 
a: windows and gauges break 
b: louves fail at 0.3–0.5psi 
c: switchgear is damaged
from roof collapse
d: roof collapse
e: instruments are damaged
f: inner parts are damaged
g: bricks crack
h: debris missile damage
occurs
i: unit moves and pipe break
j: bracing fails
k: unit uplifts (half filled)
l: power lines are severed
m: controls are damaged
n: block walls fail
o: frame collapses
p: frame deforms
q: case is damaged
r: frame cracks
s: piping breaks
t: unit overturns or is
destroyed
u: unit uplifts (0.9 filled)
v: unit moves on foundation
Figure 6: Threshold values from US Department of interior, Oﬃce of Oil and Gas [10].
Scenario 2: T2302. Tower 2302 main contents is C5+
[79 w%]. The temperature within the vessel has been chosen
as Tbulk = 170 [◦C]. This is not a true process value but
since EFFECTS only can handle single component releases
the temperature was fitted to the initial pressure within the
vessel P = 11 bar. The volume that is able to participate
in the cloud formation V = 52.64 [m3]. The release
is modelled as coming from a 20′′ pipe situated 5.3 [m]
above the ground. The inventory was modelled as pure
Heptane.
The digitized cloud shape at 11 [s] after the release, rep-
resenting maximum explosive mass, is shown in Figure 12.
Within the picture it can be seen that the cloud has spread
out in a both west and eastward way from the release
point. This is not considered as impossible since it is one
of the inherent traits of a denser than air gas to move both
up- and downwind of a release point. Since the cloud has
spread into two separate process areas two simultaneous
explosions are modelled. The distance between these two
process areas is larger than the critical separation distance for
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Figure 7: Cloud shape D1538. The cloud covers parts of the third
and forth southern process areas.
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Figure 8: Explosive mass D1538.
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Figure 9: Area of cloud D1538.
P = 700 mbar
P = 350 mbar
P = 100 mbar
P = 50 mbar
Figure 10: Structural damage using Slam threshold values for
scenario 1: D1538.
P = 345 mbar
P = 138 mbar
P = 69 mbar
Figure 11: Structural damage using ExTool threshold values for
scenario 1: D1538.
the multi-energy method [21]. The time for the digitalization
has been taken from Figure 13 and the total area of the cloud
has been taken from Figure 14.
The total area of the cloud is 14803 [m2] and the total
explosive mass is 28300 [kg].
The confined area was approximated at an onsite in-
spection, between the dispersion and explosion step, the
two diﬀerent areas are 3531 and 1010 [m2], respectively.
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Figure 12: Cloud shape T2302. The cloud stretches over two
separate process areas.
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Figure 13: Explosive mass T2302.
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Figure 14: Area of cloud T2302.
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Figure 15: Structural damage using SLAM threshold values for
scenario 2:T2302.
P = 345 mbar
P = 138 mbar
P = 69 mbar
Figure 16: Structural damage using ExTool threshold values for
scenario 2:T2302.
Figure 15 shows the diﬀerent damage zones using the thresh-
olds from SLAM. Figure 16 shows the damage zones using
the threshold values from ExTool.
6. Summary of the Results
Since there is no mechanism in EFFECTS that allows
calculation of cost an alternate way for cost estimations was
employed. Using Adobe Photoshop CS2 the number of pixels
in each damage zone was counted as the percentage of each
process unit within each damage zone.
Two apparent trends can be seen in Table 6. Except
for D-1538, this study gave higher damage costs than
those calculated by both Broker A and Broker B. In this
study higher costs are predicted when ExTool threshold
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Table 6: A summary of all results from this study.
Broker A Broker B Drifted EFFECTS: Slam TV EFFECTS: ExTool TV
V2313
Cost (million SEK) 2260 3710 5657 6714
Releasable inventory (ton) 22 22 22,5 22,5
Cloud weight (ton) 4 7,7 9,1 9,1
D1538
Cost (million SEK) 2660 NA 992 1480
Releasable inventory (ton) 15 NA 10,65 10,65
Cloud weight (ton) 3 NA 0,9 0,9
T2302
Cost (million SEK) NA 6800 8408 9020
Releasable inventory (ton) NA 83,8 52,62 52,62
Cloud weight (ton) NA 34 28,3 28,3
T2304
Cost (million SEK) 1915 4130 5251 6573
Releasable inventory (ton) 16 23,9 12,6 12,6
Cloud weight (ton) 7 9,5 5,2 5,2
V2505
Cost (million SEK) 1636 4100 4446 5258
Releasable inventory (ton) 24 24 25,2 25,2
Cloud weight (ton) 4 9,2 9,3 9,3
values are used. It has been previously mentioned that the
ExTool threshold values seem to be on the conservative
level. However this is perhaps done in order to account
for the steeper pressure decay for TNT as compared to gas
explosions.
It is also apparent that in all the scenarios studied the final
cost suggested from EFFECTS is more in accordance with
ExTool than with SLAM. The percentage of the releasable
inventory that is turned into an explosive cloud is also most
coherent between ExTool and EFFECTS. This suggests that
the simplification to use two times the flash fraction to
account for the entrainment eﬀects is acceptable.
As can be seen from Table 6 there are large devia-
tions in releasable inventory between scenarios modelled in
EFFECTS as compared to SLAM and ExTool. Most of these
diﬀerences could have been avoided if a more thorough
search of the refinery inventory had been done from the start.
7. Discussion
As a starting point for this study a definition of an EML
scenario was needed. Although a written down definition
was finally found which could cover the work about to
be undertaken as well as the brokers previous studies this
was not the only definition found. A number of different
abbreviations can be found within the literature, PML
(probable maximum loss), MCL (maximum credible loss),
MFL (maximum foreseeable loss), EML (estimated max-
imum loss), and NML (normal maximum loss). All of
these diﬀerent abbreviations, which more or less imply the
same thing, come with its own set of probability interval.
However, the intervals diﬀer between diﬀerent sources as well
Table 7: Model choice criteria
Transparency Input demand Complexity Precision
ExTool High Low Low Low
SLAM Medium Medium Medium Low
EFFECTS Medium High High Medium
as the definitions. Thus even choosing a proper probability
level for an EML is not as easy as it might sound. The
way that the two brokers handle the release from towers is
clearly mirroring this lack of clearcut definition. Not only
does an investigator have to find a proper definition and
a proper probability interval. The investigator also has to
choose one definitive source to use for probabilities of ac-
cidents.
For a refinery the size that we have studied, 140 000 m2,
it is unlikely that the modelling of EML scenarios actually
helps the decision process. With clever use of the models it is
possible to let most of the scenarios vary between denting the
closest equipment to total annihilation of the whole process
area. This kind of modelling might not have any use until
no matter how far you stretch the model there are still parts
of the refinery outside of the blast radius. Although one
should remember that domino eﬀects are neglected in EML
modelling.
In order to choose a model one must consider the pur-
pose of the modelling as well as the necessary precision of the
model. In Table 7 a set of criteria is listed in order to help with
such a decision. The criteria have been defined in accordance
to Transparency: the ease of finding, and interpreting how a
certain model works; Input Demand: The time that needs to
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be spent in order to collect the necessary data for using the
model; Complexity: The level of knowledge needed to use the
model which also reflects the amount of influence the choice
of analyst might have; Precision: A model ability to accurately
reflect the reality of a VCE.
As EML is so ill defined and the number of uncertainties
in the dispersion, drift, ignition, discharge rates, damage
thresholds, equipment failures and so forth, is so high
there is no reason to aim for a time-consuming, although
somewhat more accurate model. As a primary choice for
EML modelling, if at all such modelling must be conducted,
ExTool stand out with its ease of interpretation owing to
its high openness and low complexity. In addition the low
amount of time needed to collect the data further strengthens
its position. Also, explosion modelling is a specialist field and
it is highly inappropriate to mask the very high insecurity
in the modelling behind complex models. Although, no
matter the choice of model an increased openness about their
limitations would be in its place.
When comparing the models one can see that the
energy released as overpressure can be matched setting
parameters such as the confinement percentage and the
yield coeﬃcient at the right levels. In the results reported
herein we see the eﬀect of these two parameters. The energy
released as overpressure has been higher for the Multi-Energy
method, used by EFFECTS, simply because we have deemed
the confined area as larger than the corresponding yield
coeﬃcient used in ExTool (TNT model) by Broker B. One
remark concerning the three methods dissected here must
thus be made. Any of the three methods can be made to
fit most historical cases. In the TNT method the analyst
can adjust the yield, in SLAM (CAM method). Pref can be
adjusted and in EFFECTS (Multi-Energy method) the charge
strength and confinement values can be adjusted. All these
three overpressure models mentioned are also dependant on
a sensible choice of vapour cloud weight, which in historical
cases seldom can be definitively known. Hence, any claim,
also the ones made within this report, on historical accuracy
should be taken with a grain of salt. These flexibilities of
the models are strengths as well as weaknesses. As with
any software model it is almost always possible to get the
response one wants. Modelling must therefore be made by
a competent analyst and with a predefined set of rules that
must not be broken.
8. Conclusion
The EML concept as it is used today is a rather loosely defined
method to compute the maximal damage due to a large-
scale accident. Also, any modelling at so extreme conditions
as those used for EML scenarios are bound to be uncertain
since the scale is balancing on the validity range of any model
used. Hence improvements should be made not only to the
models used but also to the EML concept itself. Clear cutoﬀ
values for the probabilities of an accident should be used
to avoid the “not plausible” argument sometimes heard. As
for improving the models themselves, no clear reason for
working with threshold values when it comes to overpressure
damage can be found. A continuous curve seems more fitting
in the age of computers. The possibility to shift such a curve
to account for the diﬀerence in overpressure sustainability
between diﬀerent types of process equipment could also be
explored. Further, phenomenological models have been left
out of this study but the result of such a model could prove
interesting, at least as comparison.
All in all, there are many aspects to investigate further in
order to make potential loss predictions more reliable, and
this should be well worthwhile since much money is at stake
when plant owners and insurers decide on insurance limits
and premiums.
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